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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
BOOK REVIEWS
NARRATIVES OF SELF GOVERNMENT IN
MAKING THE CASE
Benjamin L. Berger*
This is a book about persuasion. In Making the Case: The
Art of the Judicial Opinion,1 Paul Kahn draws the judicial
opinion into the centre of our field of vision and invites us to
join him in inquiring into the role that it plays shaping our legal
and political communities, and in seeking to understand how it
does its work. Ultimately, he shows that persuasion is at the
heart of the judicial opinion and, with that, at the heart of the
rule of law.
The persuasion at stake in Kahn’s book is not, however,
what you might expect. Central to this insightful, creative study
is the idea that the burden faced by the judge is not—or not
chiefly—to persuade the parties that the court has reached the
correct outcome; it is, rather, to persuade us all that the law is
our own. The judicial opinion is “a form of rhetorical address
performing the broadly political task of maintaining belief in

*Professor and Associate Dean (Students), Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto. I am grateful to Kate Glover for her comments on drafts of this review and to
Jamie Shilton for his excellent research assistance.
1. PAUL W. KAHN, MAKING THE CASE: THE ART OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION (2016).
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self-government through law.”2 It is, in other words, a
persuasive act aimed at sustaining belief in a particular kind of
political community. Making the Case explains the character of
this persuasive task and the rhetorical techniques and devices
available in pursuing it. Kahn offers a schematic of the location
and inner workings of the judicial opinion within the
imaginative architecture of our political beliefs. Seeing that
picture, we are equipped to be better readers (and, in the case of
judges, also better writers) of the judicial opinion.
Kahn has established himself as a preeminent guide to the
shape and structure of our modern political and legal
imaginations. The diversity amongst his books—ranging from
in-depth studies of U.S. constitutional moments to
reexaminations of classic philosophical texts, exercises in
biblical interpretation, and studies of modern liberalism3—belies
the tight unity of his concern. Across his work, Kahn is
interested in the genealogy and architecture of the beliefs and
practices that sustain our political lives, lives in which the
culture of law’s rule plays a central role. Like Geertz and
Weber, he is interested in the “webs of significance”4 in which
we are suspended and through which we make sense of our
experiences.
We can find that web of meanings at work in any of our
cultural artefacts—the sense that we make of our lives is not
episodic or domain-specific. And so, in Finding Ourselves at the
Movies,5 Kahn examines the modern movie as a particular text
in which to find and explore questions of law, love, and
sacrifice, and how they work within our political imaginations.
He shows in that book that the movie is successful to the extent
that it participates effectively in the narratives that structure how
we understand ourselves and our communities. In Making the
Case Kahn turns his attention to a different cultural artefact, this
2. Id. at xiv (footnote omitted).
3. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997); PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW
CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (2011); PAUL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN:
ADAM AND EVE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL (2006); PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING
LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE (2004).
4. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).
5. PAUL W. KAHN, FINDING OURSELVES AT THE MOVIES: PHILOSOPHY FOR A NEW
GENERATION (2013).
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one central to the world of the law: the judicial opinion. The text
is different but the project is very similar.
In Making the Case, Kahn seeks to understand the judicial
opinion as a rhetorical act that succeeds to the extent that it
“persuades us to see the situation in light of one of the broad
narrative accounts by which we regularly give order to our
social and political life.”6 As he puts it, “the rule of law is a way
of seeing and maintaining our common social world”;7 that
burden of depiction and maintenance, Kahn argues, falls to the
judicial opinion, and so we must understand better what
precisely it seeks to do and how it works.
This is where Making the Case begins: with a desire to read
the judicial opinion more sensitively and to understand better
how it does its work as a persuasive text. In this, Kahn sees
himself as recovering the “original promise of the casebook
method”8—immersing the reader in the interplay of fact and law
in order to see how an opinion seeks to persuade. Kahn intends
the audience of Making the Case to be, in part, students coming
to the law for the first time, seeking to learn how to read a
judicial opinion. And to be sure, talented students will gather a
great deal from this book. But Kahn also notes the tradition of
academic writing on law “in which an introductory work is no
less a serious work on law”9 and Making the Case is certainly
that. The audience for this book is, in fact, complex. It is
illuminating and important reading for lawyers, whom Kahn
describes as the key audience of the judicial opinion; for law
teachers interested in legal pedagogy; for judges who seek to
better understand their judicial role and the “art of the judicial
opinion”; and for scholars interested in political and legal
theory. The book provokes ideas about legal pedagogy, could
serve as something of a manual for successful opinion-writing,
and makes serious and fresh interventions into fundamental
questions of political philosophy. The breadth of the audience to
which this text successfully appeals is one of its achievements.
Following a useful preface directed at students “with a
Note to Everyone Else,” Kahn embarks on his project of
6.
7.
8.
9.

KAHN, supra note 1, at 19.
Id. at 12.
Id. at ix.
Id. at xiii (noting Karl Llewellyn’s THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930), amongst others).
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drawing out the nature, burdens, and resources of the judicial
opinion. The richness of this small book rewards careful reading
but precludes an exhaustive account of Kahn’s argument and
insights. Rather than attempting such an account, I focus in the
balance of this review on what I take to be the core conceptual
contribution of Kahn’s account of the judicial opinion: the link
between narrative, persuasion, and self-government.
***
The decisive methodological move in Making the Case is
Kahn’s approach to the judicial opinion as a unique literary
genre. In Chapter 1, he circumscribes his subject in a way that
creates space for this distinctive and profitable framing of the
opinion. He distinguishes the judicial opinion from other legal
texts like statutes and regulations by observing that it seeks to
persuade, not solely to command: “Only here,” Kahn explains,
“does law link command to explanation.”10 His interest is thus
not in the court’s judgment but rather in the judicial opinion,
which is an explanatory, rhetorical exercise;11 in his terms, what
matters in the opinion is not principally “vote” but “voice.”
Yet he also makes distance on approaches that would
understand the opinion chiefly as an artefact of dispute
resolution, aimed at convincing the losing party.
Central to this book is the idea that every judicial opinion—
quite irrespective of the topic of law that it treats—is
fundamentally public in character, in that it is not only the
parties who are owed an explanation, but rather “we all are, for
the opinion is a public act setting forth the meaning of law for
everyone.”12 “An appellate court opinion explains the law to
those who are to live under it.”13 The formulation “are to” in this
sentence is key. That we will live under the law is not to be
taken for granted in the judicial opinion, such that Kahn could
write simply that the opinion explains the law “to those who live
under it”; there is a task to complete in each judicial opinion, a
10. Id. at 1.
11. As Kahn explains at one point, “you must look beyond the judgment to the opinion,
for only then can you come to understand how courts construct an entire world of
meaning.” Id. at 10.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id. at 5.
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burden that must be discharged through the text if the future of
living under the law (in the way that we find politically
acceptable) is to remain possible. We must be persuaded by the
text, and that persuasion turns on the judge’s ability to appeal in
the right way to the imagination of the audience, which is all of
us. This framing prepares the way for approaching the judicial
opinion as a literary genre, a move that gives Kahn analytic tools
unavailable to the doctrinalist, who is more narrowly interested
in the outcomes of legal disputes, or to the crit, whose turn away
from credulity about doctrine leads to viewing the language of
an opinion as mere rhetoric in service of ideology. Neither
framing reflects Kahn’s literary approach in which story and
imagination are key and in which the judicial opinion is a
creative production. Two analytic tools afforded by this
approach—narrative and voice—yield the core insights of this
book.14
The pivotal role of narrative in the judicial opinion is laid
out in Chapter 2. For Kahn the opinion is, at core, “an effort to
persuade us that a particular way of seeing the situation makes
sense.”15 Successful opinions do so, and the judge has two sets
of resources at hand to achieve this persuasive task. First, the
judge must provide an account of the facts and the law. Chapters
4 and 5 of Making the Case offer a thoughtful taxonomy of the
moves available to judges in framing the facts and relating them
to the law, a discussion that I commend to law students, lawyers,
and judges. The central theme in those chapters is an important
but more familiar message about the interdependency of fact and
law: we don’t know what the salient facts are without knowing
the legal issue, and it is impossible to identify the relevant law
without first having made decisions about the way in which to
frame the facts. But the central conceptual contributions of this
book do not flow from this first set of resources, but rather from
the second: the appeal to narratives.
Kahn notes that the weaving together of fact and law must
yield an account that seems sensible to us, and that it will appear
14. In this respect, Making the Case has an analytical affinity to critical literary works;
reading this text, I was put in mind of the resonances with the work of the cultural and
literary theorist Mieke Bal, in NARRATOLOGY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF
NARRATIVE (1997). Making the Case is a kind of narratology for the judicial opinion.
15. KAHN, supra note 1, at 16.
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so only “if the opinion persuades us to see the situation in light
of one of the broad narrative accounts by which we regularly
give order to our social and political life.”16 Appealing to the
literary sources that so inform the book, Kahn observes that, as
in a short story, in the judicial opinion “[w]e are introduced to
actors confronting a problem” and “[i]n the course of the
opinion, that problem must be resolved in a way that leaves us
with a sense of order, a sense that the problem has been resolved
fairly.”17 But from where does that “sense of order” arise? Kahn
explains that we feel this order when we are able to see through
the facts and law of the particular case to broad narratives—
larger themes—that we are accustomed to using in making sense
of our personal and political experiences. To succeed, the
opinion must appeal to these broad narratives; it must “present
the particular case as an instance of a more general narrative
that is already familiar to readers.”18 The sanctity of privacy,
the imperative of equality, the good of freedom; but also
personal narratives about family, friendship, love, and care:
these are the organizing narratives that we habitually use to
make sense of our personal and political experiences and to
which the judicial opinion must appeal if it is to persuade.19
Otherwise put, the opinion must connect the case to our pasts,
our imagined futures, ourselves—to our identities. Thus, Kahn
explains that “[t]he opinion persuades us when we come to see
the situation as making sense in light of these large, organizing
ideas that have already structured our understanding of ourselves
and our communities.”20 In seeking to persuade us, the opinion
trades in these narratives to “[offer] us representations that we
recognize as familiar and, more importantly, as true.”21
Seeing them within Kahn’s frame, we understand features
of the judicial craft and the character of the judicial opinion in
new ways. The dissenting opinion, for example, looks very
different when this need to appeal to narratives is foregrounded.
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 20.
18. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
19. Kahn names some of these broader narratives, but observes that “there is no list and
there are no sharp boundaries” here between the political and the personal. Id. at 22.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 34.
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The fundamental difference between a majority opinion and a
dissent is often found in the narrative offered to make sense of
the case, not in a raw dispute about the facts or the available
doctrine. But Kahn explains that dissenting opinions are not
rejecting the majority’s narrative as unappealing—such
narratives are too deep and central to reject. Rather, the dissent
is offering an alternative narrative, “to which we are also
sympathetic,”22 that purports to make better sense of the
situation by better capturing who we think we are as a political
community. With this, Kahn exposes the drama at the heart of
the judicial opinion, the essential drama that draws our interest
as lawyers, judges, and scholars, and to which—if we do our
jobs ably as teachers—we connect our students: judges struggle
to appeal to these core narratives and hope that their opinions
will persuade. And what will ultimately persuade? The answer
to that question is simultaneously an answer to the question
“Who are we?” As Kahn puts it, “[r]ead as a competition to
persuade the reader, there is genuine excitement in the
opinions.”23
In this respect, Kahn affirms the political character of the
judiciary, but he means by this something quite different than do
those writing from a realist or crit perspective concerned with
the individual or institutional ideologies or preferences
expressed through judges’ decisions. For Kahn, the attempt to
persuade through the judicial opinion involves the presentation
of a narrative that appeals to and seeks to order the complex and
contradictory values of a community in the best, most
convincing way. And “[i]f we think of politics as the domain
within which we collectively give order to the multiple values
circulating in our community, then the judiciary is a deeply
political institution.”24
Narrative thus plays a key role in Kahn’s exposition of the
judicial opinion: the opinion persuades when it successfully
situates the case within a fundamental narrative that reflects our
understanding of ourselves as a political community. We must
be persuaded to see ourselves in the opinion. But this leaves us

22. Id. at 27.
23. Id. at 33.
24. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).
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with a crucial question: Why is it essential that an opinion so
persuades us?
This is where Kahn turns to the question of voice and, in
exploring it, offers the most piercing and creative theoretical
insights of the book. If Chapter 2 is about the importance of
what a judicial opinion says, Chapter 3 is about the importance
of who we hear saying it. This is the issue of voice in the
opinion. The central conundrum around which this chapter is
built is this: Why would we accept the authority of the courts to
do the work described in Chapter 2? This is the question of the
legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking. The reader would be
forgiven for being skeptical that something new and fresh could
be offered here. But Kahn strides past the abundant literature
that seeks to address this question with variations on appeals to
trust or truth and, instead, looks for the ground of judicial
legitimacy and authority in the narrative voice of the opinion.
The arc of Kahn’s argument is set by his observation that a
central tenet of our political imaginations is that “[w]e want our
laws not only to be just but to be our own.”25 Our commitment
to the rule of law is accompanied by this commitment to selfgovernment: that the laws do not happen to us, but rather that
they belong to us in some strong sense, and that we are
responsible for them. Yet we don’t vote on all of our laws,
including the fundamental law of our constitution, and so we are
met with the question: How do we sustain this sense that the
laws are our own?
Kahn explains that “[t]he sense that the law is our own
rests on a set of beliefs about authorship.”26 This is the question
of voice: Who do we hear when we read a text? The author of a
text is not the same as the drafter or writer. The writer is the
cause of the text, whereas it is the author that we hold
accountable or responsible for it. “Authorship,” in this sense, is
“a social practice of accountability.”27 The authority of the text,
25. Id. at 49.
26. Id. at 50.
27. Id. Kahn uses familiar examples to illustrate this point about the distinction between
the writer and the author, and the way in which it turns on this “social practice of
accountability”:
[I]t is not acceptable for a professor to blame his research assistant when
problems emerge with a published text that the assistant drafted. Similarly, a
judge cannot blame her law clerk for what an opinion says. The clerk may have
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in turn, depends on who is accountable for it. With this, Kahn
moves from authorship through to authority. And, given our
political commitment to self-government, we must understand
ourselves to be the author of a legal text if it is to have authority
and legitimacy. In a resonant statement from which the rest of
this book conceptually ripples out, Kahn explains that “[a]n
important part of the work of a legal text in a democracy, then,
is to persuade us that we are its authors. Self-government begins
here, rather than with the vote.”28 Nestled as it is within such a
rich text, the significance of that statement could be missed.
Kahn is arguing that the vote is not the ground of democracy
but, rather, one expression of a more fundamental commitment
in the architecture of democratic political imagination: that we
are the authors of—and therefore accountable for—the laws by
which we live.
This is true, Kahn explains, of a constitution: “[O]ur
political relationship to the Constitution is not constituted in the
first instance by its justice or efficiency. Rather, that relationship
arises out of beliefs about authorship.”29 The point at which we
cease to see the Constitution as our own is the point at which it
ceases to have true authority and legitimacy, even if it retains its
force. This is also true of legislation: “[w]e must see through the
regulation to the statute and through the statute to its author,
who is us.”30 And his inquiry into voice reveals that this is also
true of the judicial opinion. Kahn concedes that placing selfauthorship at the ground of authority and legitimacy is not a new
idea in political and legal theory. What is new here is asking
“how the judicial opinion contributes to our social practices of
reading the legal order as a product of our own authorship.”31
The judicial opinion is, thus, successful when we are able
to see ourselves as its authors—when we receive it as an
expression of the will of the self-governing people. This is why
it is so important that we see our way of understanding ourselves
drafted the opinion, but he is not the author. He is not the author even if he wrote
every word of the opinion. No one wants to know what the clerk thought when
he drafted this text.
Id. (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 55.
30. Id. at 56 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 62.
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and our political community in the narratives of the judicial
opinion. This is, for Kahn, the ultimate persuasive burden of the
judicial opinion: to convince us that we hear our own voice, not
the voice of the court or the judge. The authority and legitimacy
of the judicial opinion rest on the judge’s success in establishing
this voice. The opinion should in consequence be read as “a sort
of draft that gains legitimacy when we imagine its author as the
people themselves acting as the popular sovereign.”32 The
successful discharge of this persuasive task—not trust or truth—
must be the ground of legitimacy for the judicial opinion if we
are to maintain fidelity to the core imaginative commitment that
we are engaged in a project of self-government. Kahn
summarizes his central claim:
The opinion, accordingly, is persuasive just to the degree
that it does not appear at all. As soon as we see the opinion
as the authored act of the Justices, we will ask with what
authority they rule in our democratic policy. There is no
answer to that question, for they have no such authority.33

Understanding this, listening for that voice, we are truly reading
the opinion: “[i]f you are counting votes, then you are not
reading.”34 The judge’s burden, then, is to persuade us to hear
the opinion as an expression of the reach and character of
democratic will, reading through the opinion to the people
themselves. “There is no other measure of legitimacy.”35
With this, Kahn explains, “[w]e are at the imaginative
foundation of the whole fabric that is the American idea of the
rule of law. The opinion of the Court is nothing less than the
opinion of the people.”36 Drawing from Weber, Kahn explains
that judges thus exercise a “charismatic” function, maintaining
the link between the legal order and the “transcendent authority
of the people,”37 the link between the profane and the sacred. To
the extent that the judicial opinion is successful in establishing
that relationship of immanence, “we solve the puzzle of how

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 84.
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popular sovereignty and the rule of law can be one and the
same.”38
How precisely does this happen? Kahn uses Marbury v.
Madison39 to explore the answer to this question, and he offers
principles that would have to guide the interpretation of a statute
to meet this persuasive demand.40 But ultimately he concedes
that “[i]f all of this seems mysterious, it is because it is. It is a
matter of faith and belief, of rituals that maintain that faith, and
of rhetoric that gives it expression.”41
The student, lawyer, or judge who reads this book must not
view this ultimate turn to mystery and faith as a failure of
precision or as somehow opaque. It is, rather, the true expression
of an approach to law that understands it as a world of beliefs
and practices that create and shape political communities, and of
a book that seeks to understand the judicial opinion as a text that
helps to sustain that imaginative world.
***
In the preface to Making the Case, Kahn describes “a
successful reading as getting the opinion to sing. There is music
in the law,” he explains, “and its audience is the well-trained
lawyer. Unless you have a trained ear, you will not hear the
melody.”42 Kahn sets out to train our ears, to help us listen to the
music of the opinion; in this, he succeeds marvelously, and in
exciting and revealing ways. The recurring melody—perhaps the
leitmotif—common to all opinions is the pursuit of that essential
persuasive objective through the use of narrative and voice: the
core burden of convincing us to see and hear through the
judicial opinion to ourselves. We need to hear this melody if we
are to hold together the rule of law with our commitment to selfgovernment. I have therefore focused this review on Kahn’s
38. Id. at 85.
39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
40. The question of how the interpretation and development of common law rules
enables them to acquire legitimacy is one that Kahn does not treat in this text. This is of
course an interesting question: Can true common law rules—those independent of statutory
or constitutional footing—satisfy the conditions of democratic legitimacy that Kahn so
convincingly sets out?
41. KAHN, supra note 1, at 86.
42. Id. at xiii.
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exploration of narrative and voice in Chapters 2 and 3, but there
is much more in this book that rewards the engaged reader.
In Chapters 4 and 5 Kahn brings us closer to the key
instruments at play in the judicial opinion—doctrine and fact—
and offers an insightful account of the moves available to the
judge as she works with each in service of the ultimate
persuasive task. In these chapters, the student, lawyer, or judge
is given a detailed picture of how doctrine and the presentation
of fact can work within the opinion, and how fact and law are
constantly interwoven. In Chapter 4 Kahn maps the “horizontal
and vertical” axes along which judges can move as they relate to
prior decisions, the horizontal representing the engagement with
past judicial decisionmaking and the vertical marking the move
outside the jurisprudence to rely on non-judicial interpretive aids
and authorities. “These two dimensions,” Kahn explains,
“provide the basic argumentative tools for the doctrinal positions
of a judicial opinion.”43 Kahn explores “the life of doctrine” in
the judicial opinion, showing that, moving along these two
interpretive dimensions, judges have three strategies available in
relation to past doctrine: to incrementally develop the doctrine
(“erudition”), to make a new doctrinal beginning (“natality”); or
to tear down an existing line of doctrine, often in an asserted
return to authoritative text (“destruction/fundamentalism”).44
Using prominent examples, Kahn’s exposition of these doctrinal
moves offers a fresh and helpful perspective from which to
understand the argumentative structure of the opinion.
In his discussion of the use and role of facts, Kahn’s
emphasis is on the reciprocal relationship between facts and law,
and on the “decisive importance of establishing context.”45 Facts
are not merely presented—a decision always sits behind the
narrative of the facts, a decision about the legal and normative
horizon against which we are asked to view these facts.
Although he does not describe his analysis as such, an evidence
lawyer will recognize this discussion as, in essence, an
exposition of the fundamental role of relevance in all parts of the
judicial opinion. What Kahn describes as context could well
43. Id. at 97.
44. Id. at 108–33 (discussing all three).
45. Id. at 140 (introducing his analysis of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952)).
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serve as a definition of legal relevance: “We need to know
something about where we are going legally if we are to make
decisions about where to begin factually.”46 But just as fact
depends on law, the successful presentation of the facts—a
narration of the facts that “convinces us that this is the way the
world is”47—can create a sense of the inexorable reasonableness
of a legal conclusion. Insisting throughout on this irrepressible
interrelationship between fact and law, Kahn engages with cases
like Roe v. Wade48 and Gonzales v. Carhart49 to explore
questions like the role of analogy and empathy in factual
reasoning and the difference between legal and scientific fact.
The latter discussion brings us back to the principal melody of
the book. Kahn explains that legal facts will always seem
deficient from a scientific perspective, but that this is not a
failing of the law. Rather, it reflects the truth that “[o]ur law is
not a science but a practice of self-government through
persuasion.”50
Making the Case is thick with both theoretical insights and
practical lessons about reading and understanding the judicial
opinion that flow from those theoretical starting points. In this, it
presents itself as a general inquiry into “the art of the judicial
opinion.” And yet Kahn draws examples exclusively from the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and leans
heavily on framings of popular sovereignty (“We the People,”
for example) that ring in a distinctively American constitutional
and political register. This is far from a criticism of Kahn’s
approach. Quite the contrary: throughout his work, Kahn has
urged that the culture of law’s rule is importantly particular, not
universal. Legal imaginations are tied to specific political
genealogies and Kahn—despite his keen interest in how the
beliefs and rituals of the culture of law’s rule shift and change
across political communities—is careful to work within the
culture and history that he knows best. Nevertheless, the
particularity of this book raises a question: How tied to the
United States are its insights and lessons? This is a question that
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 155.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 169.
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comes naturally to a Canadian academic, particularly one who
has been conscious of his use of “we” and “our” throughout this
review.
In my view, Making the Case has more reach than might be
suggested on the face of the text. The reason is simple: the
persuasive burden at the heart of the judicial opinion is and must
be common across legal orders, to the extent that they
understand themselves to be engaged in a project of selfgovernment. Much will shift from culture to culture. The broad
narratives that resonate, the values that an opinion must order,
the communities that must hear themselves in the opinion—all
will vary. That which persuades is particular. Indeed, a
fascinating way into comparative constitutionalism is to ask the
question “what persuades here?”51 But the burden to persuade in
the specific way that Kahn exposes as the heart of the judicial
opinion, as well as the need to do certain kinds of work with fact
and law, is, in my view, a feature of modern law in a
constitutional democracy. Having read Making the Case, I have
difficulty imagining how it could be otherwise. Judges, lawyers,
academics, and students outside the United States will better
understand not only the judicial opinion, but their own
constitutional cultures, after a careful encounter with this book.
Early in this review I reflected on the complexity of the
audience for Making the Case, a complexity that flows from the
fact that this book is at once a guide to reading the judicial
opinion and a philosophical intervention on the subject of selfgovernment and the rule of law. Packed with insight in both
dimensions, the book will challenge and reward the law student,
the lawyer, the judge, and the scholar curious about the unique
place of the judicial opinion in the practical and imaginative
architecture of our legal and political worlds.
But the book ends with an address to another audience: a
cri de cœur to the humanist scholar of law . . . and we should
listen. Kahn notes the force of social-scientific inquiry—and, in
particular, of economics—in the study of law and, with it, the
51. I make a similar claim in Benjamin L. Berger, Children of Two Logics: A Way into
Canadian Constitutional Culture, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 319 (2013), in which I argue that
“the study of comparative constitutional cultures should be keenly interested in those
points in the constitutional life of a country at which the claims of the particular persist in
spite of the logic of the universal.” Id. at 337–38.
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scholarly focus on efficiency, on the effect of laws on social
behavior, and on prescriptions about what the law should be. He
urges the humanist to take up the mantle of her discipline and to
pursue the very different lessons and insights that it can yield.
“For the humanist,” Kahn explains, “the problem of
understanding law is not that of deciding what the law should be
but of explaining how we actually live with the law we have
even as we argue with each other about what the law means.”52
Although the social scientist can no doubt offer useful
information about law, there are some matters—and the
persuasive task at the heart of the judicial opinion is one—for
which we need the tools of the humanities. If we wish to
understand the meaning of our legal and political practices and
experiences, we need the tools of literary and philosophical
inquiry. The humanist, whose task is fundamentally interpretive
and phenomenological,53 “approaches the legal imagination as
the source of a way of understanding oneself and one’s world
that is fundamentally built around a collective subject’s
history.”54 And with this, Making the Case ends by pointing to
the uniting feature of Kahn’s scholarship. As one of our guiding
voices in the humanistic study of the culture of law’s rule, his
objective here the same as it is in all of his work: to help us to
understand ourselves better.

52. KAHN, supra note 1, at 175 (footnote omitted).
53. Kahn explains that the humanist “approaches law as an imagined world and asks
how events, persons, and institutions appear in that world.” Id. at 177. In sympathetic
tones, I explore the nature of a phenomenological approach to legal scholarship in the
specific field of law and religion in LAW’S RELIGION: RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE
CLAIMS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (2015).
54. KAHN, supra note 1, at 174.

